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ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Utah Appellate Rule 35, the appellee, Olympus 
Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. ("Olympus Hills") submits this Answer 
to Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.'s ("Smith's") petition for 
rehearing.1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SMITH'S PETITION FOR REHEARING DOES NOT FALL 
WITHIN THE SHADOW ZONES OF THE REQUIRED STAN-
DARD FOR REHEARING. 
The rehearing petition of Smith's makes the "polite presump-
tion" that its petition is simply another automatic step in the 
appeal process, for it has blandly filed the petition containing 
repetitive factual and legal issues which it already addressed in 
the appeal and were rejected by the Court in its Opinion of 
December 30, 1994. 
Without even so much as a solitary citation of authority to 
indicate that a petition for rehearing is permitted to review the 
unremarkable issues which Smith's has raised, it makes no showing 
that the questions on rehearing are as a result of legal principle 
ignored by the Court or factual analyses contrary to uncontested 
evidence. This case has been on appeal for four years and should 
be at an end with the December 30. 1994 Opinion, unless a genuine 
This response addresses Smith's rehearing issues I and II pursuant to 
this Court's January 30, 1995 request for a response. 
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issue within the scope of rehearing is set out. Smith's petition 
presents no such issue. 
It is hornbook law that a petition for rehearing will be 
granted only when the appellate court has overlooked or fundamen-
tally misconstrued the law on a material matter. Matter of 
Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1988). Reargument of position 
and repetitive statements which have once been rejected will not be 
reconsidered on rehearing. Such would plunge the appellate process 
into automatic rehearings in either case. Kentner v. Gulf Ins. 
Co. , 689 P.2d 955, 957 (Or. 1984); Phelps Dodge Corp., Morenci B.R. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 P.2d 450, 452 (Ariz. 1962); Climate 
Control, Inc. v. Hill, 349 P.2d 771, 773 (Ariz. 1960) ("by long 
established rule" reargument of position is "not grounds for 
reconsideration"). 
As the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated in Board of Trustees of 
Weston City v. Holso. 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978): 
"It being the settled law that rehearing will not be 
granted where the application presents no new facts but 
instead undertakes to reiterate the arguments made on the 
appeal, or where the effect of the application is to ask 
the court to review its decision on points and authori-
ties already determined. . . . Now therefore the 
petition for rehearing is denied. . . . " 
Illustrations of a proper rehearing petition are where a 
decision is directly contrary to an express and unconsidered 
statutory provision, or where a decision is based on a misstatement 
of uncontroverted facts, or where a decision is contrary to a 
higher appellate courts subsequently issued decision on the same 
issue. Smith's petition herein satisfies none of those bona fide 
reasons. It simply presents the same argument once rejected by 
Judge Murphy and a second time by this Court in its Opinion. 
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Regardless of its unlimited war chest to prosecute this case 
ad nauseam. Smith7s is not entitled to reopen its case on appeal to 
repetitively argue the tired arguments that have already been 
denied. 
POINT II. 
OLYMPUS HILLS GAVE SMITH'S THE NOTICE REQUIRED 
UNDER THE UTAH UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE 
PLACING SMITH'S IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER OF THE 
SUBJECT LEASED PREMISES. 
Smith's attack on the decision of this Court and the trial 
court below, claiming error in the interpretation and application 
of the Utah Unlawful Statute is without merit. It is a desperate, 
effort to resurrect an argument twice rejected in well reasoned 
decisions, both by this Court and the court below. Smith's 
tortured argument seizes upon stray language in a 20 year old 
decision, Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(1976) taken out of context and manipulated into an argument 
directly contrary to the plain language and intent of Pinaree. 
Indeed, Smith's overstatement of the holding of that case is belied 
not only by Pinaree, but by the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute and 
the well settled case law interpreting that statute. 
On rehearing, Smith's props up for a third time its tired 
unlawful detainer argument that Pinaree v. Continental Group of 
Utah, Inc. , 558 P.2d 1317 (1976) is dispositive of the issue in 
favor of Smith's. But as this Court and the trial court below have 
both concluded that argument is "without merit." 
Smith's entire argument teeters on the faulty, inaccurate 
premise that Pinaree holds "the alternative of performance under 
the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute § 78-36-3(1)(e) must be 
3 
contained in the notice of termination, and not the notice of 
default."2 But Pinaree makes no such holding. It says just the 
opposite, that the notice of termination/forfeiture is not 
sufficient to place a tenant in unlawful detainer: 
This Court has consistently ruled a notice of 
forfeiture is sufficient to terminate a lease 
for breach of covenant but it is not suffi-
cient to place the lessee in unlawful detain-
er. 
Pinaree, at 1322 (emphasis added). 
Smith's overstatement of Pinaree is further exposed by 
Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Brown, 529 P.2d 419, 420, (Utah 1974), 
which observed that "notice in accordance with § 78-36-3(5)3 should 
have preceded any notice to quit . . . ." (emphasis added). 
Contrary to Smith's bald, unsupported statement, a tenant is not 
placed in unlawful detainer by a notice of termination, but by a 
prior notice providing the tenant with the alternative to perform 
or to vacate the premises. That is precisely what Olympus Hills 
did in its April 27, 1990 letter to Smith's, which preceded its 
letter of termination dated June 8, 1990. 
Consequently, Smith's feckless argument is unsupported, indeed 
directly contradicted, by Pinaree and Fireman's. Moreover, 
contrary to Smith's assertions, Pinaree plainly does not hold that 
2Petition for Rehearing of Appellant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. at 
2. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(5) was the predecessor to Utah Code ann. S 78-
36-l(e) (1992). 
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a notice of default cannot be used to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 78-36-3(1) (e). That issue was never even addressed.4 
The Pingree court held that an unlawful detainer action could 
not be pursued against the defendant because the plaintiff failed 
to comply with the provisions of a completely different section of 
the unlawful detainer statute, § 78-36-8, which deals with the 
nature and form of the Complaint, the time for appearance, and the 
service of summons.5 In passing, the Court observed that in 
addition to that fatal defect, the plaintiff's declaration of 
forfeiture was not conditional as required by § 78-36-3(5). 
The Pingree case is flatly inapposite. A critical distinction 
between Pingree and the instant case is that in Pingree, the 
landlord never raised the claim or argument on appeal that his 
notice of default satisfied the requirements of § 78-36-3(5). 
Instead, the landlord subsequently served a "tenant at will" notice 
that did not require the alternative of performance.6 
In Pingree, the landlord sent a letter to the tenant setting forth 
deficiencies in the maintenance of the premises and stating that if the 
deficiencies were not corrected within 30 days, the lessor intended to forfeit, 
cancel and terminate the lease. The lessor did not send or intend that letter 
to satisfy the requirements of the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statute, § 78-36-3(5). 
On appeal, he never claimed that it satisfied the alternative notice requirement 
of § 78-36-3(5). Instead, after the expiration of thirty days, the lessor served 
the tenant with a different type of notice; notice that the tenant was a tenant 
at will, and ordering the vacation of the premises within five days (apparently 
under the statutory section dealing with tenants at will, § 78-36-3(2), which did 
not require alternative notice of performance). 
5
 The Pingree court explained: "the summons was not in accordance with 
the mandatory provisions of § 78-36-8, and the complaint did not include any 
claim of forfeiture or unlawful detainer. . . . For plaintiff's failure to 
comply with [78-36-8] the trial court properly ruled they were not entitled to 
treble damages." Pingree at 1322. 
6
 The tenant at will provision authorized by § 78-36-3(2) provided that 
a tenant was in unlawful detainer "in cases of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of such premises after expiration of a notice of not less 
than five days." Section 78-36-3(2) is the predecessor of § 78-36-3(1)(b) (ii) . 
See Note 4, supra. 
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Here, unlike Pingree, Olympus Hills followed and satisfied the 
requirements of § 78-36-3(1)(e). Its notice of default dated April 
27, 1990, was specifically intended for that purpose• That claim 
was made from the inception of the litigation. Both the trial 
court and this Court have concurred in that determination. 
Smith's argument is scuttled not only by its misplaced 
reliance on Pingree, but by the plain language of the Utah Unlawful 
Detainer Statute. The statute does not require that the statutory 
alternative notice be given in a "notice of forfeiture" as opposed 
to a "notice of default." Instead, it requires that notice be 
given in writing before the termination of the tenancy, requesting, 
in the alternative, the performance of the conditions or covenants 
or the surrender of the property.7 
The Utah Supreme Court reinforced that clear statutory intent 
in Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Brownf supra holding that notice in 
accordance with § 78-36-3(5) should precede any notice to quit. 
That is precisely what Olympus Hills' letter of April 27, 1990 did. 
It gave that statutory alternative notice before terminating the 
tenancy. It is an explicit "writing requiring in the alternative 
the performance of the conditions or covenants or the surrender of 
the property," as contemplated by § 78-36-3(1)(e). In plain terms, 
the letter "demands that Smithes immediately commence operations 
and use of the premises" and informs Smith's that "in the event 
Smith's does not immediately reopen and continuously conduct normal 
A notice of default that gives 30 days' notice permitting the 
alternative of performance, pursuant to a lease provision, satisfies the 
statutory three-day notice requirement. Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 
650 P.2d 657, 665 (Idaho 1982) ("thus, the 30 days permitted to cure the default 
under the lease in the present case is much more favorable to appellants than the 
three day notice allowed under [the unlawful detainer statute]"). 
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business operations in the premises, Olympus Hills will terminate 
the Lease pursuant to paragraph 15." Both this Court and the 
court below properly have concluded that notice satisfies the 
requirements of § 78-36-3(1)(e)• Riverside Development Co, v, 
Ritchie, 650 P. 2d 657, 665 (Idaho 1982) (a 30 day notice given 
pursuant to a lease provision permitting the alternative of 
performance satisfies the unlawful detainer statute, and is much 
more favorable to the tenant than the statutory three day notice). 
Olympus Hills gave Smith's the notice required under the Utah 
Unlawful Detainer Statue, placing Smiths in unlawful detainer of 
the subject leased premises. Smith's tortured argument to the 
contrary, twice rejected by this Court and the court below, should 
be summarily rejected again. 
POINT III. 
SMITH'S BOGUS ARGUMENT AND IMPROPER PETITION 
FOR REHEARING WILL NOT WITHSTAND ANALYSIS IN 
LIGHT OF OLYMPUS HILLS' LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
NOTICE OF DEFAULT ON LEASE TERMINATION AND 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER DAMAGES. 
Under Point II of its petition, Smith's makes the same 
stilted, mechanical and improper argument on the sufficiency of 
.Olympus Hills' Notice of Default as was made on appeal before this 
Court and before District Judge Murphy. Without the citation of a 
single authority supporting this sort of wide open judicial inquiry 
on rehearing, Smith's makes an argument at pages 4-6 of its 
petition that is identical to that already rejected as flawed and 
"without merit" by this Court. (Slip Op. at 23.) Smith's must 
play by the same rules on rehearing as the ordinary party. 
In rejecting Smith's argument in the main appeal that the 
Olympus Hills Notice of Default did not provide reasonable notice 
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and that a failure to cure the default would lead to termination, 
this Court did not establish a new rule of law, nor did it overturn 
or modify existing law. It did not, as Smith's attempts to 
contend, shift the burden of alleged ambiguity in the Notice of 
Default from Olympus Hills to Smith's. What this Court plainly did 
was to look at the unambiguous Notice of Default in the factual 
context of the evidence and the determination made by the trial 
judge. 
The trial court and this Court on review, did not have to 
grope or search as to the nature or character of Smith's default 
under the Olympus Hills April 27, 1990 Notice of Default. It was 
the shutting down and closing all operations for 60 days that was 
the centerpiece of the Notice of Default. The April 27 Notice 
described with particularity what Smith's had done in violation of 
its Lease with Olympus Hills and beyond that, the specific injury 
which the default was causing. The Notice then defined with 
specificity the precise paragraph (para. 15) of the Lease which the 
default violated, as well as pointing out the option that Smith's 
had to cure the default, namely, to reopen and continuously conduct 
operations. The Notice was pointed and particular. 
But that is just part of the sad argument which Smith's 
attempts to make. It was the evidentiary setting and circumstances 
in which Smith's received the Notice of Default that finally 
disposes of Smith's contention. This was not a case where the 
Notice of Default was given to an uneducated or lay person who was 
unaware of his or her rights or the nature of the difficulty. 
Rather, this was a case of a New York Stock Exchange company who 
received Olympus Hills' Notice of Default immediately through their 
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very skilled and able retained counsel, Mr. Jardine of Ray Quinney 
& Nebeker, and their General Counsel, Mr. Fry, a self professed 
expert on commercial Leases. 
The Notice of Default was served on April 27, 1990, at a time 
when Olympus Hills had served its Second Amended Complaint in the 
case alleging prolonged closure and proposed conversion to a 
warehouse box store to be a violation of the continuous operation 
and use clauses of the Lease. (R. 393-430.) Smith's lawyers were 
so concerned about the possibility of being in default as a result 
of the April 27, 1990 Notice of Default, that it requested of Judge 
Murphy an extraordinary, emergency hearing in May 1990 on its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, so that it would know whether the 
Notice of Default would be mooted. At the trial, Judge Murphy was 
virtually incredulous that Smith's could contend, in good faith, 
and with its battery of legal counsel constantly reviewing the 
matter, an inability to determine the nature of the Notice of 
Default, its option to cure the default, and the consequences of 
termination for not so doing. 
It is the height of arrogance for Smith's to claim that it 
really did not understand or was uninformed by Olympus Hills' 
Notices. Controlling precedent plainly holds that a notice of 
default must not be "viewed in isolation" but rather construed in 
light of the surrounding events, the particular parties, and the 
circumstances. Krepcik v. Tippett, 109 Ida. 696, 710 P.2d 606, 610 
(Court App. 1985); Enders v. Hubbard & Sons, Inc., 95 Ida. 590, 513 
P.2d 962, 1000 (1973); Vole, Inc. v. Georacopoulos, 538 N.E. 2d 
205, 210 (111. Ct. App. 1989); McCarthy v. Harris, 459 N.E. 2d 
1252, 1254 (Mass. App. 1984). 
9 
Smith's complains in its Point II that all aspects of Olympus 
Hills' Notice of Default be strictly construed and that the Notice 
did not "tie the length of closure to possible forfeiture of the 
Lease." (Pet. at 4.) That is a fatuous statement. After four 
years on appeal listening to Smith's lament about strict construc-
tion and ambiguity of the April 27, 1990 Notice, in the words of 
Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, it is time to say "[t]his is not 
a matter for polite presumptions — we must look facts in the 
face."8 
The evidence disclosed that there was almost daily correspon-
dence and meetings in April 1990 between counsel for Olympus Hills 
and Mr. Jardine of Ray Quinney & Nebeker and Mr. Fry for Smith's, 
in which closure for 60 days and longer also discussed as well as 
the fact that the darkening of the leased premises for that period 
of time was a default under the Lease. The continued meetings 
between lawyers came at a time in which this lawsuit against 
Smith's had already been filed and was pending before District 
Judge Murphy in which claims of closure constituting a breach of 
lease were made. 
But on top of all that, the April 27, 1990 letter was quite 
specific and adequate in law. It identified precisely the conduct 
of Smith's in shutting down the leased premises for 60 days as a 
brazen defiance of the Olympus Hills Lease, and it pointed Smith's 
to the specific paragraph 15, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, which 
is not only the precise default and termination clause, but it sets 
Opn. in Frank v. Manqum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915). 
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out what a party may do to cure the default and avoid lease 
terminat ion. 
Nothing could have been more unambiguous, unless Smith's 
required paragraph 15 to be se t out in haec verba in the Notice.9 
This Court should note in considering Smith's p e t i t i o n , one 
r i ve t i ng fact which plays i t s e l f throughout Smith's argument on the 
adequacy of the Notice of Default. Smith's has never claimed tha t 
i t was unable to understand the Notice of Default, t ha t i t was 
unable to read paragraph 15 of the Lease fwhich i t d ra f t ed) , and 
t h a t i t was somehow deprived of reasonable not ice of i t s g lar ing 
defaul t , of the option to cure, and of termination if i t did not . 
Smith's did not make a lack of reasonable not ice argument t o e i t he r 
D i s t r i c t Judge Murphy or to t h i s Court in the main appeal. I t does 
not and cannot do so in t h i s rehearing p e t i t i o n . 
Rather, Smith's i s content to re ly upon a narrow, pe tu lant and 
mechanical argument t ha t looks a t pa r t i cu l a r words or a phrase in 
the Notice of Default in complete i so la t ion from the f a c t s . The 
fact t h a t some, but not a l l , of the matters mentioned in the not ice 
were u l t imate ly found by the jury to be breaches of the Lease, does 
Contrary to Smith's as ser t ions , the Notice of Default , as wel l as prior 
writ ings from Olympus H i l l s , s p e c i f i c a l l y referenced (1) Smith's act ion in 
ceasing operations and darkening the premises, (2) Smith's proposal t o leave the 
premises inact ive and "reopen within 60 days," and (3) Smith's expressed plan to 
change use t o a "warehouse box store under the trade name of Buy N' Save." (Ex. 
P-L.) The l e t t e r further stated that Olympus H i l l s : 
view[ed] the substant ia l period proposed by Smith's to remodel the 
premises, as an action of Smith's, in bad f a i t h , to change shopping 
habits and to divert customers away from the Olympus H i l l s Shopping 
Center to Smith's newly opened supermarket and drug center on 3300 
South and 3100 East. 
As required by Utah law, the foregoing not ice provis ions "plainly indicate 
the nature of the default or breach and give reasonable not ice that f a i lure to 
cure the default within the time allowed may lead to termination." Bentley v. 
Potter , 694 P.2d 617, 620 (Utah 1984). 
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not vitiate the Notice. As District Judge Murphy noted at the time 
of trial, a landlord is not expected to 
"precisely predict at the time of a perceived 
breach exactly how the litigation will evolve 
and precisely what a jury will find." 
(R. 2514.) 
After receiving the Notice of Default, Smith's freely elected 
to keep the premises closed and in doing so, it ran the risk that 
such may be found to be a default. Under the overwhelming and 
unambiguous facts and weight of the evidence as found by the jury, 
confirmed by the judgment of District Judge Murphy, and now 
affirmed in law on appeal by this Court, Smith's is prohibited by 
law on rehearing from making the same mechanical argument. 
Finally, it is clear that no aspect of this Court's opinion 
shifts the burden of proof on the issue of ambiguity. Smith's 
petition does not point to a section or even sentence of the 
Court's opinion, other than resorting to "word games" viewed out of 
context, that supports the claim. The complete answer is that 
ambiguity must be weighed in light of all the relevant facts, 
including the unambiguous Notice. The argument of Smith's fails on 
rehearing as it did on appeal and before the District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Smith's tactics of arguing issues that have either directly or 
implicitly been resolved against it will not work on rehearing 
before this Court. The Court's Opinion did not misconstrue the law 
or misapprehend the facts upon which the law of the case has now 
been determined. 
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The petition for rehearing should be forthwith denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ ^ 
E. BARNEY GESAS 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
of ana for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Appellee and 
Cross Appellant Olympus Hills Shopping 
Center, Ltd. 
February 17, 1995 
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LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS LEASE, executed this Q-fc day of fUAlXV\ , 1980 by and 
between OLYMPUS HILLS SHOP°ING CENTER, LTD., a Utah limited partnership, 
hereinafter referred to as "Lessor" and SMITH'S FOOD KING NO. 1, a Utah corp-
oration, having its principal place cf business at 1S44 South Redwood Road, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter rtftmi to as "Lessee". 
That the Lessor in consideration of the rent herein specified, to 
be paid by the Lessee, and the covenants and conditions herein mentioned, 
does hereby lease, let and demise unto the Lessee, and the Lessee does hereby 
rent from the Lessor, the premises herein described for the term an<- -vr the 
rental and upon the conditions herein set forth. 
1. OEMISED PREMISES 
1.01 The demised premises shall consist of the supermarket 
premises presently occupied by Lessee located at 3981 Wasatch Boulevard, and 
the adjacent drug store premises presently occupied and operated as a Skagcs 
Orug Store, located at 3979 Wasatch Boulevard, such premises being in Salt 
Lake City, Uta h and making up part of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center 
located on the land described in Exhibit HB" hereof. Exhibit "A" consists o 
a plot plan showing exact location of buildings, parking lots and the genera 
location of other tenants, 
1.02 The said buildings shall be remodeled by Lessee at a cost 
of approximately Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00) in accordance 
with plans and specifications which shall be endorsed by both the Lessor an 
the Lessee indicating their approval thereof. It is the intent of the part 
that neither Lessor nor Lessee shall be required to accept or agree to any 
plan or specification to wnich 1t objects, but that once agreement has beef 
reached, both the parties may rely thereon. All remodeling shall be comp 
within eighteen (18) months after the commencement of the term of this 
Lease. „ — J O 
LQSSOO shall pay to Lesso* as Additional Rent during the terw ef this lease i" 
annual sprinkler charge in the amount of Sas billed _^^^wtffcKcharge shall 
be due and payable on the termicopiua»«nr5ntdate and thereafter on the 
yearly anniver^j^-orT*tne term commencement date during the term of this 
14. UTILITIES 
14.01 Lessee shall pay all the charges for gas, electricity, 
water, sewer and any other utilities used in the demised premises during the 
term of this Lease. 
15. OEFAULT 
15.01 If Lessee shall default in the fulfillment of any of the 
covenants or conditions hereof except payment of rent, Lessor may at its 
option, after thirty (30) days1 prior written notice to Lessee, perform 
any such obligation of Lessee and charge the cost thereof to Lessee as addi-
tional rent payable with the next due installment of fixed rent or terminate 
this Lease, unless within said interval Lessee shall have corrected the 
breach specified in said notice. Such a termination, if elected, shall be 
as complete and effective as if this Lease shall have expired by its terms, 
and the Lessee shall thereupon quit and surrender the premises. If Lessee 
shall make default 1n the payment of rent or any part thereof, or in 
making any other payment herein provided for, and such default shall con-
tinue for a period of fifteen (15) days after written notice to Lessee, or 
1f the leased premises or any part'thereof shall be abandoned or vacated, 
or if Less** shall be dispossessed therefrom by or under any authority other 
than Lessor, or if Lessee shall file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, 
or if Lessee shall institute any proceeding under any insolvency or act 
seeking to effect reorganization or a composition with its creditors, or 
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if in any proceeding based upon the insolvency of Lessee or relating to 
bankruptcy oroceedmgs a Receiver or Trustee shall be appointed for Lessee, 
or the leased premises, or if any proceeding shall be commenced for the 
reorganization of Lessee, or if the leasehold estate created hereby shall 
be taken or. execution or by any process of lav/, or if Lessee shall admit *n 
writing its inability to pay its obligations as they become due, then 
Lessor may, at its option, terminate this Lease, without notice? and Lesso-
or its agents may immediately or at any time thereafter re-enter the leased 
premises and Lessee shall thereafter have no rights hereunder. After default, 
Lessee shall pay Lessor all damages which occur as a result of Lessee's 
breach. In addition to any other remedy provided by law or permitted nere:n 
upon Lessee's default, Lessor may, at Its option, but without being obligated 
to do so, re-let said premises on behalf of Lessee, applying any monies 
collected, first to the payment of expenses of obtaining possession; second, 
to the payment of costs of placing the leased premises in rentable condition; 
and, third, to the payment of rent due hereunder, and any other charges due 
Lessor, and Lessee shall remain liable for any deficiency in rental which 
shall be paid to Lessor upon demand. Lessor's re-entry for the purpose of 
obtaining a new Lessee shall not constitute a re-entry for Lessor's own use. 
Rent shall continue to accrue hereunder until Lessor re-enters the premises ftl 
its own use. Lessee agrees to pay all costs and a reasonable attorney's 
fee incurred by Lessor 1n enforcing any provision hereof, or in obtaining 
possession of the premises or in following any other remedy provided Lessor 
by law, whether by suit or otherwise. Waiver of any of the covenants hereof 
by Lessor shall not be deemed of 'taken to be a waiver of any succeeding or %i 
dJ 
J 
\ 
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